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Introduction
Many ecosystem governance approaches seek to change land-use or natural resource
use patterns in order to reduce environmental degradation. Some use command-
and-control regulations or ‘sticks’ that restrict access to and use of ecosystems, while
others employ ‘incentive-based mechanisms’ (or ‘carrots’) to change behaviours,
or a combination of the two (Börner et al., 2015; Nunan et al., this volume).
Incentive-based instruments are ‘assumed to allow social actors more freedom to
coordinate among themselves in pursuit of societal goals’ (Jordan et al., 2005: 497).
The umbrella of incentive-based instruments includes mechanisms ranging from
subsidies and taxes to conditional transfers, and can be market or non-market based.
In this chapter, we focus on one of the most ubiquitous incentive-based governance
instruments applied to ecosystem services in recent years: payments for ecosystem
services (PES). Some argue that there are very specific conditions necessary for
PES: a voluntary agreement or contract between a buyer and a provider, conditional
upon provision of a well-defined ecosystem service (as per Wunder, 2005).
However, in many cases PES has become a generic term for initiatives that transfer
benefits or rewards to providers/stewards of ecosystem services, whether these be
via cash payments, in-kind transfers or provision of services (e.g. training in new
farming techniques, access to health care). Over time, frameworks for understanding
ecosystem services have evolved (see Pascual and Howe, this volume) and, in parallel,
definitions of and concepts behind PES have changed. In this chapter, we explore
several key questions: (i) how have definitions of PES evolved and changed over
time (and what are the theoretical and practical implications)? (ii) Can environment-
centred and pro-poor focused outcomes of PES projects be better harmonised
towards an environmental/poverty win-win scenario? (iii) What are the power,
equity and justice challenges for PES? And (iv) What are the ‘lessons learned’ from
the theoretical and on-the-ground realities of PES to date towards effective and
sustained pro-poor PES mechanisms in the future?
How have definitions of PES evolved and changed 
over time?
The term PES has evolved over time and is used to describe a wide range of inter -
ventions that aim to change behaviours that lead to environmental degradation
through incentive-based mechanisms. PES arose from the recognition that although
all humans derive benefits from ‘services’, such as water, the onus often falls on
people in rural areas and in developing countries to steward the world’s remaining
natural services (WCED, 1987). For example, for people downstream in cities to
have clean water, people upstream in the mountains must not contaminate it; how -
ever, this may prevent them from fishing or irrigating their lands in the most efficient
ways for them, so there are opportunity costs to stewardship. Theoretically there -
fore, the buyer compensates or rewards the steward for protecting the ecosystem
or the specific ecosystem services.
The conundrum of how to appropriately compensate stewards (ecosystem
services ‘providers’) resulted in a steep increase in attention to the valuation of
ecosystem services, for the purpose of quantifying the opportunity costs of steward -
ship. Much of the early literature on PES focused on questions of ecosystem services
valuation, willingness-to-pay and opportunity costs (Engel et al., 2008; Pagiola et al.,
2005). Over time, the focus has shifted increasingly towards social issues beyond
monetary value and markets (see Box 12.1).
To date, there is consensus neither about the definition of PES nor the
conditions necessary for its implementation. The most widely cited definition, by
Wunder (2005), states that PES requires five key criteria to be met:
• a voluntary transaction where a
• well-defined ecosystem service (or land-use likely to secure that service) is
being
• ‘bought’ by (at least one) buyer from a
• (at least one) provider
• if, and only if, the provider secures ecosystem service provision (conditionality).
This perspective sees PES as a means to enact the Coase Theorem, that trade
in externalities can lead to efficient outcomes if transaction costs are low. However,
some assert that this definition is too narrow because very few successful on-the-
ground examples of such ‘true-PES’ actually exist. According to Engel (2016), two
basic types of PES can be distinguished: Coasean PES result from a direct nego -
tiation between ecosystem service beneficiaries and ecosystem service providers.
Alternatively, Pigouvian PES resemble an environmental subsidy, where payments
are made by a government agency out of specified user fees (e.g. a water charge)
or taken as a tax. However, many existing and most new PES schemes represent
hybrids of the two.
Although PES is often labelled a ‘market-based’ mechanism and critics ques -
tion its ‘commodity fetishism’ (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010) and its dependence on
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BOX 12.1 EVOLUTION OF RESEARCH ON PES: CHANGING
PREVALENCE OF KEYWORDS
Based on a keyword search in Web of Science carried out on 19 December
2017, we trace the changes in the proportion of articles in the PES literature
that address different themes. Articles with PES in the title/abstract began to
appear in 2004 and gained momentum in 2007, quickly numbering hundreds
of papers per year. REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Degradation) became a substantial contributor to the PES literature base from
2008. REDD+ articles appear to have peaked in 2014, yet still represent
approximately half of the papers on PES and/or REDD+. Over time, papers
that mention poverty and/or wellbeing have decreased in relative prevalence
compared with those that look at power and/or institutions. Themes of equity
and justice have grown in relative prevalence since 2008, and are now on a
par with the number of papers mentioning poverty and/or wellbeing. The
language of ‘trade-offs’ and ‘win-wins’ has been used in 10–15% of papers
since 2012. The shift in keywords present in the PES literature reflects a
change in the perceived importance of particular aspects of PES: PES is no longer
put forth as a simple and efficient mechanism for protecting ecosystem
services, and authors continue to debate the social context and conditions
necessary for positive outcomes.
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FIGURE 12.1 Evolution of PES and REDD+ publications from 2004–2017.
neoliberal market-based incentives, in many cases PES is not market-based. Corbera
et al. (2007) maintain that PES often contravenes the purist (i.e. Wunder, 2005)
definition as there are no ‘actual markets where ecosystem services are sold to service
buyers’ (p.366). The nature of ecosystem services, some of which are privately
owned while others are public goods or communally owned, creates barriers to
market conditions. In many cases, the commodity is ill-defined and governments
act as intermediaries by mobilising resources from consumers to a government fund
(Corbera et al., 2007).
Some assert that high transaction costs and the role of the state in defining or
allocating property rights over the resources/ecosystems linked to ecosystem ser -
vices means that Coase Theorem does not entirely apply to the reality of PES, which
should therefore not be considered a market-based instrument (Tacconi, 2012).
Additionally, case studies across the globe highlight both the methodological issues
with a theoretical and practical market-based approach that involves the state, as
well as cautioning against attribution of any observed changes in behaviour of the
participants only to the PES (market) mechanism itself (Kumar and Muradian, 2009).
Rather, these authors demonstrate that even those cases that seem stoically market-
based, actually involve a myriad of specific socio-political and economic circum -
stances that are inherently dynamic over time and space, interacting with PES carrots
and sticks in different ways that ultimately produce specific types of PES hybrids.
As a result of these observed complexities, the ecosystem services concept began
to increasingly acknowledge the role of human agency, political processes and power.
The PES literature has seen a shift away from adherence to ‘true-PES’ market-
based models towards emphasis on institutions, power and equity and a widening
of the concept to include what some consider to be ‘PES-like’ initiatives. Indeed
Wunder (2015) himself expanded his definition to acknowledge many of the
constraints to ‘true-PES’ in practice. The theoretical and practical shift in PES from
a large-scale, market-based mechanism, to one which seeks to merge ecosystem
service protection with poverty alleviation at a more local (project-based) level,
has led to thinking about a move away from direct compensation for specific
ecosystem services to one which approaches the problem with a more holistic
institutional approach (Hejnowicz et al., 2015; Shelley, 2011).
The emphasis on ‘payments’ in PES is considered problematic by some, as many
projects depend upon reciprocal agreements or ‘rewards’ that are not directly
conditional upon measured outcomes (Whittaker et al., this volume; Kovacs et al.,
2016). In some countries, the use of the term ‘payments’ sparks opposition to PES
(e.g. Bolivia, Asquith and Vargas, 2007). A recent PES law in Peru is labelled the
Law on Compensation Mechanisms for Ecosystem Services (Law 30215, June 2014)
(Government of Peru, 2014) as a result of objections to the term ‘payments’. Some
have proposed a shift in language towards the use of the term ‘Rewards for
Ecosystem Service Stewardship’ (Shelley, 2011) as a term that more accurately
reflects the types of mechanisms carried out under the PES-umbrella.
PES is seen by some as an exchange of incentives or rewards or even reciprocal
agreements (Asquith and Vargas, 2007). PES thus represents a transfer of resources
(e.g. money, education, infrastructure) between social actors (e.g. individuals,
governments, non-governmental organizations) that ‘aims to create incentives to
align individual and/or collective land use decisions with the social interest in the
management of natural resources’ (Muradian et al., 2010: 1205). For Kosoy and
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Corbera (2010), PES could alleviate poverty by creating an ‘urban–rural compact’
that transfers resources from ‘consumers’ to ‘providers’. Muradian et al. (2010) pro -
pose that economic incentives are just one of many drivers that may influence
behavioural patterns in relation to land use and the stewardship of ecosystem services,
such that PES must be flexible enough to account for:
• the importance of economic incentives: the relative role of the payment/
transfer in guiding behaviour
• direction of transfer: extent of intermediaries’ involvement in the process
• degree of commodification: extent to which the ecosystem service can be
assessed/acquired in measurable quantities.
The PES literature studies such a range of interventions that the picture of what
PES is, what it should be and what its impacts are becomes blurred. For example,
some studies of PES include reciprocal watershed agreements (RWA), and REDD+
(Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) was described as ‘the
largest PES experiment in the world’ (Corbera, 2012). Whether or not RWA and
REDD+ are ‘true-PES’, they nevertheless provide insights that are relevant to
moving PES forward and which we draw on below.
The impact of payment type and conditionality on PES 
outcomes
Early interest in PES arose from the belief that the dependence on conditional
payments made the PES model institutionally simpler and more technical in nature
than Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs), which were
widespread but considered relatively ineffective (Ferraro, 2001). As outlined by
Porras and Asquith (this volume), PES is often considered one form of a broader
set of mechanisms called conditional transfers. Conditionality of PES requires:
contracts/negotiations that are linked to measurement of performance, monitoring
of said performance and rewards/sanctions based on performance (Engel et al., 2008).
Yet, as Fisher (2013) highlights, conditionality is rarely enacted in full and it obscures
the importance of justice outcomes. Payment based on performance means there
are prerequisites to participation in PES projects that may not be available to all
actors: wealth is an influencing factor in project participation (which links to con -
cerns about power and elite capture) (Fisher, 2013). Conditionality can also be
problematic for more technical reasons – the outcomes sought by PES are often
multi-dimensional and difficult to measure.
It is important to distinguish between PES initiatives that condition payments
based on actions (e.g. conversion to conservation agriculture; planting of trees on
farms) and those that are conditional on outcomes (e.g. reductions in deforestation
rates, improvements in water quality). While some projects support actions that
build assets like agroforestry (Porras et al., 2013; see also Box 12.2) and apiculture
(Asquith et al., 2008), others focus on restricting activities, as Shelley (2011) discusses,
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while others use a mixed approach (e.g. Bolsa Floresta in Brazil, Viana, 2008). Indeed
as Shelley (2011) points out, in some cases, it may be more straightforward to
monitor actions and behaviours instead of outcomes, such that true conditionality
can become prohibitively expensive. For example, monitoring the number of trees
a household planted along a riparian zone is easier than monitoring water quality
and attributing changes to a particular household’s actions.
Some argue that projects should ‘bundle’ services so that several ecosystem
services and multiple social aspects could be included in the same project
(Hejnowicz et al., 2015). Others argue that it is better to ‘stack’ them, whereby
separate payments/schemes are made for different ecosystem services from the same
place (Reed et al., 2017). Given the interconnectedness of ecosystem services and
processes, bundling, stacking and single-service projects need to address risks of
double-counting and additionality in project design and implementation in order
to maintain environmental impact and economic efficiency (Hejnowicz et al., 2015).
BOX 12.2 PES IN COSTA RICA: MANAGING TRADE-OFFS
Costa Rica’s PES programme is one of the earliest examples of large-scale PES.
Starting in 1997, the programme paid farmers for carbon storage, watershed
protection and conserving biodiversity. Payments were for actions designed
to bring ecosystem service benefits but not for actual outcomes in terms of
ecosystem provision.
In ecological terms, the programme has been a success, covering almost
1 million ha of land since 1997 and increasing forest cover from a low of 21%
in the 1980s to 50% by 2012. In socio-economic terms, the programme tried
to encourage small- and medium-sized property owners by facilitating access
for smaller producers. At first, areas with a low social development index were
targeted, but after finding that benefits were captured by wealthier people 
in these areas, the system now weights applications from small (<50 ha)
properties higher than others. Transaction costs for small producers were
lowered by providing group contracts, decentralising the administrative offices
where applications could be made and simplifying the contracts. The
introduction of asset-building agroforestry and reforestation activities was
more attractive to small producers than use-constraining activities like forest
protection. However, smaller properties come with a trade-off as they may
result in a more fragmented landscape, leading to lower ecosystem service
outcomes. Another trade-off facing the programme is balancing the desire to
introduce better indicators for ecosystem services against the increased cost
of such monitoring systems.
Source: Porras et al. (2013)
PES initiatives also differ in the ways they distribute payments/rewards: some
are individual/household based (e.g. China’s SLCP, Liu et al., 2010; Costa Rica’s
national PES, Porras et al., 2013), others focus on community/collective rewards
(e.g. Mexico’s hydrological PES project in ejidos, Kerr et al., 2014) and others
implement a combination (e.g. Bolsa Floresta, Viana, 2008). In cases where
landscape-level changes are sought, collectively distributed payments/rewards may
be more realistic than household/individual payments (Kerr et al., 2014). Kaczan
et al. (2017) found that group participation in design and the presence of group-
coordinating mechanisms increased the impact of PES projects and helped reduce
the free-rider effect and other problems inherent in collective rewards. In their Agent
Based Model of the potential to use agglomeration payments (where participants
receive bonus payments when a neighbour joins the project) for PES schemes focused
on conservation agriculture, Bell et al. (2016) found that agglomeration payments
increased adoption and efficiency by decreasing the cost of payments and
monitoring.
Furthermore, not all land-use/resource-use decisions are linked to rewards, and
changes in these behaviours cannot always be ‘compensated’ with payments/
rewards. Keane et al. (2016) found that PES projects assume that behavioural changes
can be adequately compensated, but this is often not the case, particularly for women
and other marginalised groups. Payments are often based on opportunity costs that
are calculated without attention to the social and cultural values of ecosystem services,
and based on static/baseline household poverty levels which mask changes in
opportunity costs over time (Van Hecken et al., 2015). In some cases, payments
fail to cover the calculated opportunity costs (Kosoy et al., 2007), let alone the
more nuanced interpretations of the ‘cost’ of changing behaviours.
Pro-poor vs environment-centred PES: poverty alleviation
as co-benefit, a pre-requisite or a cause of trade-offs?
Even though some of the earliest examples of PES included poverty alleviation as
specific objectives or assumed co-benefits, some authors insist that PES was
conceptualised ‘as a mechanism to improve the efficiency of natural resource
management, and not as a mechanism for poverty reduction’ (Pagiola et al., 2005:
239). According to Wunder (2013: 231), the shift towards inclusion of pro-poor
objectives in PES arose because ‘While user-financed PES programs tend to focus
on their environmental goals, government-financed programs often de facto come
to politically drift into win-win spheres of multiple side-objectives, such as poverty
alleviation, regional development, or electoral motives.’ Some believe that there
are inevitable trade-offs between the two objectives of environmental effectiveness
and poverty alleviation, and hesitate to endorse a win-win discourse (Engel, 2016;
Pagiola et al., 2005; Vira et al., 2012). Nevertheless, Pagiola et al. (2005) conclude
that there can be important synergies between PES and poverty reduction when
programme design is well thought out and local conditions are favourable.
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Despite a lack of consensus regarding the pro-poor origins of PES, concern over
its wellbeing outcomes is at the core of many papers on PES. Sikor (2013)
highlights concerns over the ‘justices and injustices’ linked to ecosystem services,
and finds that the design of PES can have different justice outcomes (also see Dawson
et al., this volume). According to Pascual et al. (2014) (among others), procedural
fairness in PES can promote synergies between environmental and equity objectives
so that PES can be socially progressive and can successfully integrate environmental
and poverty alleviation goals. Those prioritising environmental outcomes tend to
see participation as a transaction cost whereas a procedural justice lens would require
participation (Fisher, 2013).
The debates around socio-environmental safeguards and co-benefits in REDD+
are particularly relevant to questions around pro-poor vs pro-environment
outcomes. While REDD+ could bring income to the poor, the poor run the risk
of suffering from elite capture, loss of access to land and lack of voice in decision-
making (Peskett et al., 2008). There are concerns that national REDD+ pro grammes
could ‘recentralise’ control of forest and land, thereby negatively affecting local
peoples’ rights and livelihoods (Phelps et al., 2010). Tenure security and effective
participation of local communities are seen as means to ensure both pro-poor and
pro-environment outcomes (Chhatre et al., 2012). If REDD+ ignores the capacity
of local people to contribute to local development, it could repeat the environ -
mental vs poverty trade-offs found in previous schemes (e.g. ICDPs, land-use
policies) (Pokorny et al., 2013). Visseren-Hamakers et al. (2012) assert that these
non-carbon values are critical to the legitimacy and effectiveness of REDD+ and
should be seen as prerequisites and not ‘co-benefits’.
However, in a systematic review of the literature, Samii et al. (2014: 7) found
‘little reason for optimism for the potential of current PES approaches to achieve
both environmental conservation and poverty reduction benefits jointly’. Pokorny
et al. (2013) found that forest conservation initiatives in the Amazon that focused
on environmental objectives tended to create barriers to forest use, while pro-poor
initiatives showed ambivalent results for environmental outcomes. A randomised
control trial of an avoided deforestation PES project in Uganda found environ -
mental benefits (lower rates of tree cover loss in project communities compared
with controls), but ambiguous results for poverty (household expendi tures neither
increased nor decreased) (Jayachandran et al., 2017). Yet some studies found bene -
fits for both the environment and poverty alleviation. Liu et al. (2010) found
improved income for farmers in China’s SLCP which had some success in
converting agricultural lands back to forest. In Cambodia, Clements et al. (2010)
found increased income from a bird-nest protection programme, with simultaneous
increases in bird populations.
Beyond the question of win-wins vs trade-offs, it is still unclear whether or not
PES leads to pro-poor outcomes. In their review, Börner et al. (2017) found no
consistent trend in poverty alleviation impacts. While aggregate-level evaluations
may indicate positive/negative outcomes, assessments of the poverty alleviation
components of PES initiatives must recognise that there are likely to be winners
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and losers, and any indicators of wellbeing must be disaggregated to account for
differentiated outcomes (Daw et al., 2011).
Power, equity and justice: who participates? Who wins?
PES is inherently political (Van Hecken et al., 2015). As Muradian et al. (2013)
assert, PES is ‘part of broader structures of power.’ Different groups can influence
the design and implementation of PES payment schemes, thereby influencing their
effectiveness and distributional outcomes (Muradian et al., 2013). The ‘providers’
of ecosystem services comprise a range of actors, from rural households who – for
example – maintain forest cover, to communities involved in watershed protection
to developing countries whose reductions in deforestation are rewarded under
REDD+. Participation of different groups in PES, and barriers to participation,
are at the centre of many concerns about equity and justice in PES (see below and
Dawson et al., this volume). Intermediaries, who facilitate interactions between
‘buyers’ and ‘providers’, play a fundamental role in PES project design and imple -
mentation. Participation of government actors in PES often comes in the form of
an intermediary due to their role in assigning land rights allocation and in
monitoring relationships between private sector ‘buyers’ and local citizen ‘pro viders’.
In some cases, government institutions act as the intermediary in nego tiating the
terms of contracts, while in others this role falls to civil society organisations. In
all cases, effective and flexible institutions are important for PES implementation
on the ground (Hejnowicz et al., 2015).
Given their role as facilitators and brokers, intermediaries are in a position of
power in determining PES project design, objectives and who benefits. For
example, in the ‘Uganda Trees for Global Benefit’ project, the project proponent
(the intermediary) was a conservation organisation and chose indigenous tree species
of lower market value than exotics thus improving environmental outcomes at the
cost of local livelihood benefits (Schreckenberg et al., 2013). Vatn (2010) highlights
that intermediaries are powerful in determining the conditions for participation
in/benefit from PES, and Corbera et al. (2009) found that half of the payments
linked to PES are going to intermediaries and verifiers.
Access to benefits from PES is often disproportionately accrued by households
who are already better-off than the poorest households in a given community.
Poudyal et al. (2016) found elite capture of resources in a REDD+ project in
Madagascar, where local institutions were used to determine ‘project-affected parties’
who would/would not receive safeguards compensation as part of the establish-
ment of a protected area linked to the REDD+ project. Similar challenges faced
a project in Uganda, where poorer households were unable to participate in a 
tree-planting project due to lack of access to funds to cover upfront costs (Peskett
et al., 2011).
For Ishihara et al. (2017) it is essential to analyse another layer of socio-ecolo -
gical complexity: agency and power relations that arise from PES. Ecosystem service
providers become ‘institutional bricoleurs’ who draw on social and cultural
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arrangements and institutional contexts to build new institutions that are adapted
to their local contexts (Ishihara et al., 2017). Institutional bricolage thus challenges
the view of actors as powerless victims of institutional change. Van Hecken et al.
(2015) point to the flaws in the discourse that PES institutions can be ‘designed
to fit’, given the complex power structures and social norms within which PES
must operate. Locatelli et al. (2014) highlight the potential for PES to destabilise
local institutions.
REDD+ has elicited concern regarding its impact on equity and power dynamics
at both local and international scales, leading to worries over the potential for
dispossession of both the lands and livelihoods of indigenous peoples (Mahanty
and McDermott, 2013). The McDermott et al. (2013) equity framework has
provided a useful lens to assess equity in REDD+, PES and other similar initiatives.
Schreckenberg et al. (2013) applied the framework to a study of a carbon project
in Uganda, and found a clear bias towards participation by better-off farmers in
the project. Applying the framework to REDD+ in Indonesia, Ituarte-Lima et al.
(2014) highlight the structural obstacles to participation of marginalised groups.
Projects that require land ownership as a prerequisite for participation will exclude
landless households, and consequently the poorest and most marginalised. In
addition to being excluded from some projects, the landless poor can be impacted
negatively if PES programmes restrict their access to rights or resources (Tacconi,
2012).
While some point to REDD+ safeguards as an example of best practice to mitigate
some of these power imbalances and resulting inequity of the distribution of benefits,
safeguards will not be enough to ensure that projects bring livelihood benefits to
the poorest and most marginalised groups. Conceptualised as mechanisms that make
sure projects ‘do-no-harm’, they do not require positive benefits per se (Sikor, 2013).
As highlighted above, safeguard processes can be susceptible to elite capture and
exclusion of marginalised groups (Poudyal et al., 2016). Mechanisms like FPIC (Free,
Prior and Informed Consent) can help ensure consultations of local people and build
on lessons from other initiatives/sectors (e.g. mining, certification), but are often
carried out without the adequate time-frames, methodological flexibility and
participatory learning that is needed (Mahanty and McDermott, 2013).
PES schemes are commonly developed from the top-down by governments,
conservation agencies and NGOs, or developed with only partial involvement of
a narrow range of stakeholders (Reed et al., 2017). However, bottom-up collab -
orative PES projects are increasingly promoted to address concerns about social
justice, elite and/or regulatory capture and, particularly, for poverty alleviation (Vatn,
2010). Thus, a place-based approach is becoming particularly significant for PES.
Lessons learned: counterfactuals and local context as the
way forward?
Our synthesis of three reviews of case studies evaluating different aspects of PES
schemes such as social, environmental, economic and institutional dynamics
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(Ezzine-de-Blas et al., 2016; Hejnowicz et al., 2014; Samii et al., 2014) revealed
that none could find more than 55 papers that fit their criteria for inclusion. Several
sets of scholars tried to run statistical models on PES impact evaluation results, but
almost all of them recognised that their own strategies were severely impaired 
by the small sample size (ibid.). The heterogeneity of results outlined in earlier
sections further complicates efforts to generalise. There is simply not enough empi -
rical or counterfactual evidence to be able to glean solid generalised conclusions
with relation to best PES theory and practice in order to have any standard pro -
cedures. Understanding empirical patterns emerging from the growing body of case
studies worldwide (and indeed increasing the number of such reports) could be
the best way forward to help us gain new insights for policies and best practices.
Although generalised conclusions about PES design and implementation are not
possible at this point in time, some lessons have been learned that are relevant to
achieving pro-poor and pro-environment PES:
Context matters
Many authors point to the importance of local context in design and imple mentation
of PES schemes, and the effect of context (in all the forms discussed in this chapter)
on PES outcomes (Poudyal, 2017; Rodríguez-Robayo and Merino-Perez, 2017).
As Poudyal (2017) found in his review of ESPA’s research on PES, locally adapted
approaches are, to date, the most successful. Ezzine-de-Blas et al. (2016) highlight
the importance of customised design of PES, and Börner et al. (2017) point to the
importance of accounting for locally specific contextual dimensions (e.g. politics,
institutions, pre-existing policies) in project design.
In order to understand how to create PES initiatives that provide win-wins, we
need to recognise the trade-off between blueprints that can be implemented at a
wider scale and the creation of efficient, effective and equitable PES models that
are adapted to local contexts (Rodríguez-Robayo and Merino-Perez, 2017), and
work with existing institutions in order to design PES but also recognise how
existing power structures and social norms embedded within those institutions can
influence pro-poor/equity outcomes (Van Hecken et al., 2015). The challenge lies
in identifying the ‘appropriate (hybrid, context-dependent and adaptive) insti tutional
arrangements that can ensure optimal resource use, beneficial collective action and
hence more equitable and ecologically sustainable governance’ (Van Hecken et al.,
2015: 119).
Language matters
The language of PES is important (Shelley, 2011). PES has been used as an umbrella
term for many different types of interventions and project designs such that reviews
of PES outcomes are clouded by their comparison of ‘apples and oranges’, which
makes generalisations difficult and brings risks for social and environmental
outcomes, particularly for the poorest and most marginalised. There has been a shift
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away from seeing PES as market-based payments towards more holistic rewards 
for stewardship. While there is variability, most PES/PES-like initiatives are volun-
tary and based on conditional rewards for changes in behaviour. The degree of
conditionality and the type of reward/payment has impacts on both environ mental
and poverty/equity outcomes (Shelley, 2011). ‘True-PES’ may be an elusive beast
without many real-world examples of its implementation but there are risks,
particularly to the poorest and most marginalised, to lumping a wide range of
interventions and projects designs under the ‘PES-like’ umbrella.
Equitable outcomes matter
PES has evolved to reward people who make livelihood-altering changes to how
they manage the land for environmental stewardship. These stewards represent a
wide range of actors with their own relationships with nature, and need to be
rewarded (or incentivised) in ways that are appropriate to their context (social,
cultural, economic, political) and provide just outcomes. Pro-poor and justice out -
comes should not be a ‘co-benefit’ but instead a prerequisite. In order to achieve
pro-poor/justice outcomes, interventions must be designed with pro-poor and
equity-based objectives as central tenets from the outset. In particular, projects must
address both direct and indirect impacts on the poorest and most marginalised
households.
Power matters
Understanding existing power structures is essential to making pro-poor and
equitable PES a reality. PES can increase long-term sustainability, local legitimacy
and agency by emphasising local priorities and bottom-up project design which is
adapted to local contexts. It also must recognise and explicitly address power
dynamics and the roles of both informal and formal institutions and elite capture
in influencing behaviours that affect ecosystem services, but also in determining
access to ecosystem services and benefits from PES.
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